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Abstract
“We need more time: more time for leisure” Linton Kwesi Jonhson used
to dub. Our study of an OLG economy with endogenous labor supply gives
a rational to the dub poet’s claims. In the model we present the golden rule
is defined as the pair of capital-labour ratio and individual labour supply
which maximises the steady state utility of each generation. When, other
things equal, agents prefer to work more the higher (lower) the opportunity
cost of leisure, individual labour supply as a function of capital per unit
of labour reaches a minimum (maximum) at the golden age. Therefore, a
reduction in the length of the working week could well be welfare improving
whenever labour supply is increasing (decreasing) in the opportunity cost
of leisure and the economy is getting closer to (farther from) the golden
age.
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1. Introduction
Dynamic efficiency has been a key issue in the growth literature since the seminal
contributions by Phelps (1961,1962,and 1965). As shown by Samuelson (1958) and
Diamond (1965), infinite-horizon competitive economies with finite-lived agents
might reach dynamically inefficient steady states such that the marginal rate of
return to physical capital would be lower than the rate of growth of population.
Under these circumstances, Pareto optimality can be restored by imposing an
intergenerational redistribution scheme from young to old individuals opportunely
tuned so to achieve the Golden Rule level of physical capital accumulation, which
is defined as the long run level of capital that maximises per-capita consumption
of each generation.
The empirical evidence produced by Abel et al. (1989) indicates that economies
such as the US and the OECD countries are indeed dynamically efficient (see also
Feldstein adn Summers (1977)). Accordingly, various economists have argued in
favour of policies aimed at increasing the propensity to save. In fact, as discussed
by Pagano and Jappelli (1999), while forcing higher savings by repressing con-
sumption credit in a dynamically efficient overlapping generation (OLG) economy
is welfare-detrimental for the very first generation, it would make all subsequent
generations better off. 1 However, other authors, like for instance Ibbotson (1987)
and Mishkin (1984) find that, in the time interval which goes from the 20s until
the 80s, both in the US and in various other countries the mean value of riskless
interest rates was well below the economy’s average growth rate, which would
rather indicate a situation of dynamic inefficiency. If anything, in accordance to
that, one should recommend an intergenerational redistribution aimed at slowing
the accumulation of capital rather than at encouraging it.
Independently of the endless debate on whether economies are dynamically
efficient or not,2 the fact that market economies might fail to achieve the opti-
mal steady state process of capital accumulation, which Phelps defines as Golden
Age, provides a strong motivation for the large literature focusing on the welfare
properties of long run growth paths and the related policy issues. While many
contributions in that area rely on the hypothesis of inelastic labour supply, there
1Hence, their statement that “[...] the Pareto criterion is extremely demanding and need
not forestall all policies intervention. Even if there is not obvious candidate for a social wel-
fare function when households are not altruistically linked, any benevolent planner will try to
trade-off the interests of current and future generations by weighting their utility appropriately
[...]”(Jappelli and Pagano, 1999, p...).
2Blanchard and Fisher (1989) argue that at the time the debate was still open.
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is evidence that aggregate labour supply moves over time both at high frequencies
(see Lucas and Rapping (1969), Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988)), and low fre-
quencies (see Maddison (1991), (1995) and Evans et al. (2001)). Such empirical
regularities motivate the study of growth models with endogenous labour supply
at least on two different grounds: i. what are the consequences of labour supply
decisions for the steady state stock of accumulable inputs; ii. how labour supply
changes with the steady state level of accumulable inputs.
There is a well established literature based on endogenous labour decisions
that reconsiders the various benchmark results obtained assuming inelastic labour
supply, like for instance the growth-effects of taxation (Stokey and Rebelo 1995)),
the accumulation of human capital (Ortiguera 2000, Duranton, 2001), and the
interplay between portfolio and retirement decisions (Kingston 2000). Some of
these studies are however based on Ramsey-type models and have therefore little
to say about the dynamic efficiency properties of the decentralised steady-state
equilibria. Others, while based on the OLG framework, neither look at the golden
value of individual labour supply, nor they provide an analysis of how labour
supply differs from its golden value depending on the steady state level of capital
accumulation.
Both these two aspects appear to be relevant from a welfare view-point: a.
What is the golden rule level of labour supply? b. Is the level of labour supply
greater or smaller than its golden rule level when the economy is dynamically
efficient/inefficient and how does it change as the economy gets closer to its Golden
Age?
This paper constitutes a prime attempt to explore these questions. We restrict
our attention to a standard Diamond model in which production is characterised
by decreasing returns in accumulable inputs. Agents are identical and live for
two periods, have a linearly-separable utility function defined over consumption
in both periods and leisure, and supply labour when young to finance life-time
consumption. The paper is closely related to Nourry (2001) and Nourry and Ven-
ditti (2001) who provide a more general analysis of the dynamics of OLG models
with endogenous labour supply. However, differently from these contributions, we
focus our analysis on the welfare properties of the steady state achieved by the
laissez faire economy.
The model we consider yields a steady state equilibrium such that the level
of labour supply is a function of the steady state level of capital. The Golden
Age is consequently defined as the pair of capital labour ratio and labour supply
which maximises the steady state utility of the representative agent subject to the
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typical resource constraint faced by a benevolent dictator. Clearly enough, steady
state labour supply being determined by the steady state level of capital implies
that labour does not play any role as a policy to achieve the Golden Age. But,
how much do agents work in the decentralised economy compared to the golden
rule level of labour supply? And, how does individual labour supply change if
the economy’s steady state gets closer to the Golden Age? Our main finding is
that, whenever agents tend to work more the higher is the opportunity cost of
leisure, individual labor supply will be decreasing in the steady-state capital labor
ratio as long as the economy is dinamically efficient, and increasing otherwise.
These conclusions are reversed whenever agents tend to work less the higher the
opportunity cost of leisure. In our framework, the opportunity cost of leisure is
correctly defined as the utility loss from forgone consumption, taking into account
the intertemporal allocation of income preferred by the individual. The intuition
behind our results lies in the effects induced by a change in the steady state level
of capital on the opportunity cost of leisure so defined. When the economy is
dynamically efficient, the effect of an increase in the steady state value of capital
per unit of labour on the level of wages and the future value of savings3 is such
that the opportunity cost of leisure is reduced. Therefore, agents driven by the
substitution effect will work less, while those driven by the income effect will
work more. These conclusions are reversed in the case of a dynamically inefficient
economy. Agents driven by the substitution effect (income effect) in their labour-
leisure decision would find it optimal to work more (less) as capital increases.
To put it in other words, if agents are driven by the substitution effect (income
effect), individual labor supply considered as a function of the capital labour ratio,
reaches a global minimum (maximum) at the golden age.
These results have some potential implications for the 35 hours-debate in Eu-
rope, which up until now has been questioned from an academic perspective mainly
within standard labour economics literature such as in the case of Marimon and
Zilibotti (1999). Kaldor’s stylised fact that the capital-output ratio should be
constant is widely accepted by economic theorist. The constancy of this ratio di-
rectly implies that, with constant returns of scale, also capital per unit of effective
labour should be constant. However, empirical evidence based both on the World
Penn Data and the Extended World Penn Data developed by Duncan Foley and
Adalmir Marquetti shows that in countries such as the EU, the US, Japan, Canada
and Australia, the capital-output ratio has been growing steadily in the period
3Note that the future value of savings will generally depend both on the wage and the interest
rate.
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1963-90, which leads to a legitimate presumption that also the long run level of
capital per unit of effective labour has been indeed growing also. If so, our analysis
suggests that, provided that these economies are dynamically efficient and agents
are driven by the substitution effect in their labour-leisure decisions, it might in-
deed be optimal to reduce individual labour supply over time, which might offer
a justification for the request of a reduction in the length of the working week,
assuming this was originally set optimally by the law.
It is needless to say, that a proper assessment of the above implications would
require a model which combines endogenous labour supply and long run growth,
which is beyond the scope of this paper where we are only concerned with changes
in the level of labour supply induced by changes in the steady state level of capital-
labour ratio.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
describes the dynamics and the steady state properties. Section 4 carries out the
welfare analysis. A final section concludes.
2. The Model
We consider a perfectly competitive one-good closed economy populated by a
continuum of size 1 of infinitely-lived atomistic firms and overlapping generations
of individuals. At each time t a new generation of Nt individuals is born. Each
of these individuals lives for two periods and gives birth to 1 + n individuals
in her/is second period of life. Hence, the generation-size evolves according to
Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt. Individuals are born with no endowment but one unit of time
which they allocate to labour and leisure in their first period of life. In the first
period of their life they supply labour to firms, consume part of the resulting
income and save the rest to finance second period consumption. Agents derive
direct utility from consumption in the two period of their life and leisure (only
in the first period of life). Their preferences are described by the following CES
function
Ut =
1
1− σ
µ
c1−σ1t +
1
1 + ρc
1−σ
2t+1 + b(1− lt)1−σ
¶
, (2.1)
where Ut is the individual utility of a member of generation t, c1t and c2t+1 repre-
sent consumption in the first and the second period of life respectively, lt ∈ [0, 1] is
labour supply, so that 1 − lt is leisure, ρ is the subjective discount rate, b and σ
are positive parameters.
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Firms use a constant return to scale technology described by
Yt = F (Kt.Lt) = Kαt L1−αt , (2.2)
where Yt is production, Kt is physical capital, Lt is labour and α < 1 is the
product-share of capital. Labour and capital are paid their marginal productivity:
wt = (1− α)Kαt L−αt (2.3)
rt = αKα−1t L1−αt − 1, (2.4)
where, for simplicity, we assume full capital depreciation.
2.1. The individual problem
Each young individual maximises (2.1) subject to the standard constraint
c1t +
c2t+1
Rt+1
= wtlt, (2.5)
where Rt+1 = 1 + rt+1 is the gross interest rate. Condition (2.5) states that the
present value of consumption should be equal to the labour income wtlt. The
maximisation problem faced by each individual is
max
{lt,c1t,c2t+1}
L = 1
1− σ
µ
c1−σ1t +
1
1 + ρc
1−σ
2t+1 + b(1− lt)1−σ
¶
+ λ(wtlt − c1t −
c2t+1
Rt+1
),
(2.6)
where λ is the Lagrangean multiplier. The solution implies the following saving
(S∗t ) and labour supply (l∗t ) choices
S∗t =
1
1 + (1 + ρ)
1
σ R
σ−1
σ
t+1
wtl∗t = s(Rt+1)wtl∗t (2.7)
l∗t =
1 + (1 + ρ)
1
σ R
σ−1
σ
t+1
1 + (1 + ρ)
1
σ + (Rt+1wt)
σ−1
σ (1 + ρ)
1
σ b 1σ
= l (Rt+1, wt) , (2.8)
where
s(Rt+1) =
1
1 + (1 + ρ)
1
σ R
σ−1
σ
t+1
(2.9)
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is the propensity to save. As usual, savings are increasing in Rt+1 for σ < 1 and
decreasing otherwise.4 Similarly, for the labour supply, σ < 1 implies ∂l∗t /∂wt > 0
and ∂l∗t /∂Rt+1 > 0, while the opposite is true for σ > 1.5 Finally, S∗t is increasing
in wt if σ < 1, while the impact of a change in wt is ambiguous if σ > 1.6 Summing
up
S∗t = bS( +Rt+1, +wt)
l∗t = l
µ
+
Rt+1,
+wt
¶ if σ < 1
and
S∗t = bS( −Rt+1, ?wt)
l∗t = l
µ
−
Rt+1,
−wt
¶ if σ > 1.
4Differentiation of S∗t with respect to Rt+1 yields
∂S∗t
∂Rt+1
=
ds(Rt+1)
dRt+1
wtl∗t +
∂l∗t
∂Rt+1
s(Rt+1)wt.
Since s(Rt+1) wt and l∗t are always nonnegative, we have that
∂S∗t
∂Rt+1
is positive (negative)
if both
ds(Rt+1)
dRt+1
and
∂l∗t
∂Rt+1
are positive (negative). Moreover, since, these derivatives have
always a common sign,
∂S∗t
∂Rt+1
> 0 follows if σ < 1.
5Obviously, if σ = 1, both labour supply and propensity to save are constant: l∗t = (2 +
ρ)/(2 + ρ+ b (1 + ρ)), s = 1/(2 + ρ).
6The derivative of S∗t with respect to wt is
∂S∗t
∂wt
= l∗t + wt
∂l∗t
∂wt
.
Hence, ∂S∗t /∂wt is surely positive if σ < 1 so that ∂l∗t /∂wt > 0 holds. However as long as σ > 1,
∂l∗t /∂wt < 0 follows so that the sign of ∂S∗t /∂wt becomes ambiguous. In this case the sign will
depend on the magnitude of |∂l∗t /∂wt|. In particular ∂S∗t /∂wt < (>)0, if elw < (>)− 1, where
elw =
∂l∗t
∂wt
wt
l∗
is the elasticity of the work effort with respect to wages. Notice that ∂S∗t /∂wt < 0 only if
σ >> 1.
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3. Dynamics and Steady state
In equilibrium Lt = Ntlt holds7, so that output per effective worker, Yt/Ntlt, is
equal to yt = f(kt) = kαt , where kt = Kt/Ntlt is capital per effective worker. The
equilibrium values of the interest and the wage rates are given by
rt = αkα−1t − 1 (3.1)
wt = (1− α) kαt . (3.2)
Capital evolves over time according to
Kt+1 = StNt, (3.3)
which, given expression (2.7), implies
(1 + n)kt+1lt+1 =
1
1 + (1 + ρ)
1
σ R
σ−1
σ
t+1
wtlt. (3.4)
Substituting for the equilibrium values of wt and rt+1 we obtain the following
accumulation equation
(1 + n)kt+1lt+1 =
(1− α) kαt
1 + (1 + ρ)
1
σ
¡
αkα−1t+1
¢σ−1
σ
lt. (3.5)
The equilibrium level of labour supply evolves according to equation (2.8). Hence,
the dynamics of the economy is described by the following system
kt+1 =
lt (1− α) kαt
(1 + n) lt+1
h
1 + (1 + ρ)
1
σ
¡
αkα−1t+1
¢σ−1
σ
i (3.6)
lt+1 =
1 + (1 + ρ)
1
σ
¡
αkα−1t+2
¢σ−1
σ
1 + (1 + ρ)
1
σ +
£
(1− α) kαt+1
¡
αkα−1t+2
¢¤σ−1
σ [(1 + ρ) b]
1
σ
(3.7)
7In all subsequent analysis we drop the "∗" for simplicity.
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3.1. Steady state: existence and stability
A dynamic equilibrium is a sequence {kt, lt}∞t=0 that satisfies equations (3.6) and
(3.7) with k0 exogenously given. Given the accumulation equation (3.5), any
steady state level of capital k satisfies
φ(k) = (1 + n)k − (1− α) k
α
1 + (1 + ρ)
1
σ (αkα−1)
σ−1
σ
= 0. (3.8)
In order to investigate the existence of non-trivial steady state values we focus
on8
ψ(k) = φ(k)k = (1 + n)−
(1− α) kα−1
1 + (1 + ρ)
1
σ (αkα−1)
σ−1
σ
. (3.9)
Proposition 1. Our economy experiences a unique and saddle point stable steady
state equilibrium k∗ : ψ(k∗) = 0.
Proof. ψ(k) is a continuous function of k for k ∈ (0,∞). Moreover
lim
k→∞
ψ(k) = lim
k→∞
(1 + n)− (1− α) k
α−1
(1 + ρ)
1
σ (αkα−1)
σ−1
σ + 1
= (1 + n) (3.10)
lim
k→0
ψ(k) = lim
k→0
(1 + n)− (1− α) k
α−1
(1 + ρ)
1
σ (αkα−1)
σ−1
σ + 1
= −∞, (3.11)
where, in the case of σ > 1, (3.11) follows from the application of the Hôpital’s
rule. It then follows that there exist at least one value of k, call it k∗, such that
ψ(k∗) = 0 holds, which means that our economy admits at least a steady state
equilibrium k∗. As for uniqueness, we only need ψ(k) to be monotonic in k. It
can be easily verified that
ψ0(k) =
(1− α)2kα−2
³
1 + 1σ (1 + ρ)
1
σ (αkα−1)
σ−1
σ
´
h
(1 + ρ)
1
σ (αkα−1)
σ−1
σ + 1
i2 > 0 (3.12)
8Notice that in the standard Diamond model, k = 0 is a steady state equilibrium if f(0) = 0.
But, as Nourry (2001) points out, with endogenous labor supply agents do not work if there is
no production so that f(k) is no longer defined for k = 0. Thus no trivial steady state exists
(k = 0) and the dynamical system can be such that there is no steady-state equilibrium.
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for all k ∈ (0,∞) which directly implies that k∗ is unique. Therefore both the
existence and the uniqueness of k∗ are guaranteed for any value of σ > 0. As
for stability, we can notice that since we have CES utility function and Cobb-
Douglas production function, (which has a elasticity of capital labor substitution
equal to 1), we can apply the sufficient condition stated by Nourry-Venditti (2001)
according to which in a CES economy, if the elasticity of capital-labor substitution
is greater than or equal to 1, the steady state is saddle-point stable.¥
4. Welfare analysis
Since the seminal work by Diamond (1965) and Samuelson (1958) we are aware of
the fact that OLG economies may well suffer of dynamic inefficiency, a situation
which, applying the standard golden rule definition to our model, corresponds to
a value of k such that
k > kGR ≡
µ
α
1 + n
¶ 1
1−α
, (4.1)
where kGR is the golden rule level of capital labour ratio, i.e. that particular level
of k that maximises each generation per-capita consumption, a sufficient condition
for individual welfare maximisation when utility depends only on consumption.
However, in our model, individual utility depends both on consumption and labour
supply. Therefore, labour supply should be taken into account when computing
the golden rule for this economy. In particular, whenever all generations carry
the same weight in the social welfare function, in order to maximise the steady
state utility of each generation, the central planner will choose a pair {kGR, lGR}.
In other words, the golden rule for our economy, g, is defined as g = (kGR, lGR).
Formally, g solves the following problem
max
c1,c2,l,k
Ut =
1
1− σ
µ
c1−σ1 +
1
1 + ρc
1−σ
2 + b(1− l)1−σ
¶
(4.2)
s.t. c1 +
c2
1 + n = l(k
α − k (1 + n))
where the steady-state resource constraint has been derived by imposing the
steady-state conditions on the following aggregate constraint
Kαt L1−αt = Kt+1 + c1tNt + c2tNt−1. (4.3)
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Accordingly, the centralised solution implies
kGR =
µ
α
1 + n
¶ 1
1−α
(4.4)
lGR = (1 + ρ)
1
σ + (1 + n)
1−σ
σ
(1 + ρ)
1
σ + (1 + n)
1−σ
σ +
"
(1− α)
µ
α
1 + n
¶ α
1−α
#σ−1
σ
[b (1 + ρ)]
1
σ
.(4.5)
4.1. How does labour supply behave getting closer to the golden rule?
The steady state values for k and l in the decentralised economy are
k = (1− α) k
α
(1 + n)
h
(1 + ρ)
1
σ (αkα−1)
σ−1
σ + 1
i (4.6)
l = 1 + (1 + ρ)
1
σ (αkα−1)
σ−1
σ
1 + (1 + ρ)
1
σ + [α (1− α) k2α−1]
σ−1
σ [(1 + ρ) b]
1
σ
(4.7)
A comparison with the expressions (4.4) and (4.5) suggests that, as in the
standard Diamond model, it is not guaranteed that the decentralised economy
will spontaneously reach the golden age (Phelps, 1961). Also, in our model, for
any k 6= kGR,the agents will choose a level of labour supply l which is generally
different from lGR. However, l is a function of k such that if k = kGR, then
l(kGR) = lGR follows. Therefore, setting k to its golden rule level is a sufficient
condition for the economy to reach the golden age: g = (kGR, lGR).
Imagine a stationary economy which is not in its golden age, i.e. (k, l) 6= g.We
then face the following question: under which conditions is the golden rule level
of labour higher or lower than the steady state level reached by the decentralised
economy?
The aim of this question is to investigate whether individuals work more or
less than in the golden age, given a steady state level of capital k . In particular,
how does the steady state level of labour supply l compare with the golden rule
level lGR assuming that k is respectively greater (dynamic inefficiency) or lower
than kGR? In other words, we are interested in distinguishing between the cases
in which welfare maximisation is associated with a reduction of the level of labour
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supply relatively to that associated with the decentralised economy, as opposed
to situations in which the reverse is true.
In steady state, l(k) = l(R(k), w(k)), (see equation (4.7)). Therefore, the
labour supply l changes with k according to
l0(k) = lw
dw
dk + lR
dR
dk , (4.8)
where lw(k) and lR(k) are the partial derivatives of l with respect to w and R
respectively, evaluated at steady state. Given equation (4.7), we have
lw =
µ
1− σ
σ
¶
R(k)σ−1σ w(k)− 1σ [b(1 + ρ)]
1
σ
h
1 + (1 + ρ) 1σ
i
h
1 + (1 + ρ) 1σ + [R(k)w(k)]
σ−1
σ [b(1 + ρ)]
1
σ
i2
lR =
µ
1− σ
σ
¶
R(k)−1w(k)σ−1σ [b(1 + ρ)]
1
σh
1 + (1 + ρ) 1σ + [R(k)w(k)]
σ−1
σ [b(1 + ρ)]
1
σ
i2 .
By substituting for lw and lR we obtain the following
l0(k) ≷ 0⇔
½
εw,k ≷ εR,ks(R(k)) if σ < 1
εw,k ≶ εR,ks(R(k)) if σ > 1 (4.9)
where
εw,k =
¯¯¯¯
dw
dk ·
k
w(k)
¯¯¯¯
εR,k =
¯¯¯¯
dR
dk ·
k
R(k)
¯¯¯¯
s(R(k)) = 1
1 + (1 + ρ)
1
σ R(k)σ−1σ
.
Note that εw,k and εR,k measure the elasticities of wages and gross interest rate
with respect to k. Hence, condition (4.9 ) can be interpreted as follows. Let
us assume a marginal positive change in k. If εw,k − εR,ks(R(k)) > 0, the relative
change in labour income, net of the negative relative change in the value of savings
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per unit of income, is positive. Accordingly, agents driven by the substitution
effect in their labour-leisure decisions (i.e. individuals characterized by a σ < 1)
should work more since leisure has become more expensive, i.e. its opportunity
cost has increased. By contrast, for the very same reason, agents driven by the
income effect (i.e. individuals with σ > 1) will find it optimal to work less. These
conclusions are reversed as long as εw,k − εR,ks(R(k)) < 0. The crucial task
becomes to evaluate condition (4.9) at the steady state value of k. In this respect,
we can state the following result:
Proposition 2. In steady state and for σ < 1, l0(k) > (<)0 for every k > (<)kGR,
while for σ > 1, l0(k) > (<)0 for every k < (>)kGR.
Proof. Substituting for the equilibrium values of w and R, condition (4.9),
considered only with the “<” sign, can be re-written as
l0(k) < (>)0⇐⇒



s(k) > (<) α
1− α if σ < 1
s(k) < (>) α
1− α if σ > 1
. (4.10)
In steady state, given equaton (3.8),
k = s(k)w(k)
1 + n =
s(k)(1− α)kα
(1 + n)
so that
s(k) = (1 + n)
(1− α)kα−1 . (4.11)
Substituting (4.11) into (4.10) , we obtain
l0(k) < (>)0⇐⇒
½
(1 + n) > (<)αkα−1 if σ < 1
(1 + n) < (>)αkα−1 if σ > 1 .
Which directly lead us to the following
l0(k) < (>)0⇐⇒
½
k < (>)kGR if σ < 1
k > (<)kGR if σ > 1 .
¥
The above proposition describes how labour supply changes optimally as the
economy’s steady state moves either toward to or away from the golden age con-
ditional on whether the economy is dynamic efficient or not and individual pref-
erences.
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4.2. Implications
Kaldor’s stylised facts that the rate of return to capital and the labour share of
income are roughly constant over time are well established and widely accepted
among economic theorists. These two facts imply that the capital-output ra-
tio, K/Y, should also be constant. Yet, the empirical evidence one could draw
both from the original World Penn Data (wp) and the Extended World Penn
Data (ewp)9, which includes the original World Penn Data version 6 plus other
aggregates’ estimates by Duncan Foley and Adalmir Marquetti challenges such
implication. For instance, in the period 1963-1990, the evidence for both EU
countries, US, Canada and Australia is of a generalised and steady increase in
K/Y as shown in Figure 1. The average growth rate of K/Y over the all period
considered is either 1.46 (ewp) or 1.62 (wp) for Canada, 1.15 (ewp) or 1.34 (wp)
for the USA, 3.8 (ewp) or 4.94 (wp) for Japan, and 1.77 (ewp) 2.3 (wp) for the
UE.10
A feature of the above evidence which is of interest in the context of our
analysis is that it implies a positive trend in the long run level of capital per unit
of effective labour for the period considered11. Normalising the growth rate to
zero, this implies an increase in the steady state level of the capital-labour ratio.
The model then suggests that, conditional on dynamic efficiency and whenever
agents are driven by the substitution effect in their labour-leisure decisions, in
most of the countries considered the optimal level of individual labour supply
has been decreasing in the period 1963-90. Then, assuming the length of the
working week was originally set optimally by the laws still in place, one should
conclude that there is a case for a reduction in the working week length. This
conjecture could be of some interest for the working week reduction debate and
it seems potentially worth a deeper investigation. However, it is our view that,
a comprehensive assessment of the relevance of this argument, should be based
9Version 6 of the World Penn Data as well as its extended version by Duncan Foley and
Adalmir Marquetti can be downloaded at http://homepage.newschool.edu/~foleyd/epwt/.
10See also Foley and Michl (1999).
11The existence of a positive trend in the capital per unit of effective labour is supported by
Wolff (1991) who shows that in various industrialised countries capital per effective labour has
been varying over long periods, quite differently from Kaldor’s stylised evidence. For instance,
over the period 1950-79, Italy (0.06%), Germany (0.15%), UK (0.71%), US (0.14%), Canada
(0.38%) all experienced positive growth rates of capital per unit of effective labour. Moreover,
over the same period, the average growth rate for the all sample of the G7 countries has been
0.25%. The only exception to this tendency is France whose growth rate of capital per unit of
effective labour has been -0.47%.
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on model which combines endogenous labour supply and long-run growth.12 Such
investigation goes beyond the scope of the present work whose main focus is on the
effects of changes in the steady state level of capital-labour ratio on endogenous
labour supply within the context of a standard overlapping generation model à la
Diamond.
5. Conclusion
This paper considers the relationship between endogenous labour supply and the
long-run level of physical capital per unit of labour in a standard overlapping
generation model à la Diamond augmented to include leisure in the utility function
of the individuals. Our main finding is that if individuals are driven by the
substitution effect in their labour-leisure decisions the optimal level of individual
labour supply reaches its minimum whenever the equilibrium value of the capital
labour ratio is equal to its golden rule level. On the contrary, if agents are driven
by the income effect, then the level of individual labour supply is maximum when
the capital labour ratio is at its golden rule level. Consequently, in the case of a
dynamic efficient economy, whenever agents work less the higher the opportunity
cost of labour, they will optimally decide to work less following an (exogenous)
increase in the long run level of capital per unit of effective labour. The opposite
would be true if the economy were dynamically inefficient.
12Note that it would not be of much use to simply augment our model to allow for exogenous
growth. In fact, because of the assumptions about individual preferences we adopt, with positive
growth labour supply converges either to zero or to 1, which is clearly unsatisfactory in the light
of empirical evidence.
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